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Digital Warfare: Unmasking Two Networks Attacking Syria's Revolution

Misbar's Editorial Team Misbar's Editorial Team
News
23rd December 2024
Digital Warfare: Unmasking Two Networks Attacking Syria's Revolution
While some celebrated Assad's ousting, others feared repercussions (Getty)

Prior to Bashar al-Assad's fall on December 8, social media platforms in the Arab Countries showed a spectrum of opinions regarding the Syrian conflict

As the Syrian opposition forces made territorial gains and asserted control over key urban centers, online discourse reflected a divided public sentiment. Some users expressed support for the opposition's advancements, viewing them as a positive step towards change in Syria. Conversely, others voiced opposition to these gains, due to concerns about the implications of the opposition's growing influence or allegiance to the existing regime.

Many users expressed support for the Syrian opposition, particularly praising the rapid advances made by HTS and other opposition groups. These forces successfully captured key cities, including Damascus, marking a historic shift after over 60 years of Baath Party rule. The swift military campaign was seen as a triumph for those advocating for change in Syria, with some commentators highlighting the potential for a new political landscape in the country.

The implications of Assad's fall extend beyond Syria, affecting regional dynamics. In Lebanon, for instance, there were mixed feelings; while some celebrated Assad's ousting due to historical grievances, others feared potential repercussions for Lebanon's fragile political landscape and refugee situation. 

Syrian Army's False Narratives Amidst Opposition Gains

The narrative surrounding the Syrian regime was shaped by conflicting claims from various factions, particularly regarding the capabilities of the Syrian army. Assad's backers repeatedly insisted that the Syrian army would quickly crush the opposition, painting a picture of a swift victory. They also refused to acknowledge the facts on the ground, such as the opposition's hold on cities like Hama and Homs, However, the developments on the ground starkly contradicted this narrative.

Reports indicated that opposition forces made significant advances into Homs, Syria's third-largest city. On December 6, 2024, the opposition claimed to be at the walls of Homs, leading to a mass exodus of civilians as the situation deteriorated. 

The Syrian military attempted to downplay these developments, stating that conditions in Homs were “stable and safe,” a claim that has lost credibility amid the ongoing offensive. Also, The rapid capture of both Hama and Aleppo raised questions about the Assad regime's military capabilities and its ability to maintain control over key urban areas. 

Just a day earlier, on December 5, 2024, opposition forces successfully entered Hama, another critical city under Assad's control. This marked a significant setback for the regime, which previously viewed Hama as a bastion of stability. The Syrian military's response involved repositioning troops outside the city in an effort to avoid urban combat. 

Two Social Bots Networks Discrediting the Syrian Revolution

Following Assad's fall, the narrative quickly turned to discrediting the revolutionaries and vilifying the Syrian revolution itself. Misbar uncovered two primary networks engaged in this online assault and responsible for these attacks on what happened in Syria. 

Analysis showed that these campaigns were driven by social bots and automated accounts designed to spread propaganda and manipulate public opinion, controlled by two key groups: 

  1. Some Shia factions, deeply hostile to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime.
  2. Some Arab networks that oppose the emergence of a new Syrian state.

Misbar found that the content in these accounts conveyed two primary concepts. The first is the narrative surrounding the Syrian revolution, by these two networks. Its associated groups have been heavily influenced by propaganda tactics employed by both the Assad regime and various opposition factions. This discourse often portrays revolutionary groups as violent and inhumane, particularly through associations with extreme acts such as “sexual jihad” and brutal violence.

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Numerous scholars and journalists have expressed doubts regarding the veracity of sexual jihad claims. For instance, David Kenner from Foreign Policy noted a lack of evidence supporting the existence of sexual jihad in Syria, suggesting it might be an elaborate disinformation campaign.

The second strategy employed by these bots focused on racism and efforts to expel and attack Syrians in Arab countries, especially Egypt. This was most evident in the hashtag #يا_سوري_ارجع_دارك (Syrian, go back home) which was filled with tweets from these bots clearly supporting such views.

There is a growing trend of coordinated online campaigns that spread misinformation and hate speech against refugees. In Egypt, Misbar has uncovered a rising discomfort among an Egyptian network of social bots regarding the presence of Syrian refugees.

Various hashtags have emerged that explicitly call for the deportation of Syrians and other refugees. For instance, hashtags like #ترحيل_السوريين_واجب_وطني (deporting Syrians is a national duty) reflect a systematic effort to dehumanize and marginalize these communities. The use of such hashtags is not organic; they are often amplified by the network of the fake accounts that Misbar monitored. 

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Misbar analyzed both networks and discovered numerous connections between the social bots in each network. One notable account, “Posey Amer,” serves as a link between the two networks. Posey shared content related to Sexual Jihad and also participated in the hashtag #يا_سوري_ارجع_دارك. Additionally, Misbar found a connection between Posey and “المايسترو,” a central figure in the Egyptian network.

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The Network that Misbar Analyzed 

Inauthentic Accounts and Manipulated Engagement

The examination of fabricated accounts on X (formerly Twitter) reveals several characteristics typical of bot activity. These accounts often use fake names and profile pictures, which are common indicators of inauthentic behavior on social media platforms.

Also, they post a high volume of posts in a short time frame, often repeating the same content multiple times, and their engagement with other users is minimal, with few interactions that appear automated or spammy. 

The bot accounts have a disproportionate number of followings compared to followers, indicating they may follow numerous other bots while having few genuine interactions. Concerns have also been raised about verified bot accounts on X, where some bots have managed to obtain verification status despite being inauthentic. This situation complicates the identification process, as paid verification does not necessarily ensure authenticity.

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The Digital Assault on Syrians and the Targeting of Refugees

The strategies and tactics employed by social bot networks to target Syrians are multifaceted, focusing on disinformation, hate speech, and the amplification of negative narratives. These tactics aim to shape public perception, delegitimize the Syrian revolution, and foster xenophobic sentiments against Syrian refugees. Here are the primary strategies identified:

  • AstroTurf: This tactic involves creating an illusion of widespread grassroots support for anti-Syrian sentiments. By flooding social media with coordinated messages, these bots simulate a consensus that can influence public opinion and policy discussions.
  • Flooding Hashtags: Known as “Twitter bombs,” this tactic involves overwhelming specific hashtags with coordinated posts from bots to drown out opposing views and create a dominant narrative that aligns with anti-Syrian sentiments.
  • Creating Fear and Division: The content generated by these networks often aims to instill fear among local populations regarding the presence of Syrian refugees, suggesting that they pose a threat to social cohesion or economic stability. This psychological manipulation can lead to real-world violence against refugees.

Analysis of the online content disseminated by these networks revealed tangible, real-world consequences. Misbar found that these coordinated online attacks have actual implications, contributing to a growing discomfort among local populations regarding the presence of Syrian refugees. The use of social media bots creates an illusion of widespread support for anti-refugee sentiments, thereby influencing public opinion and policy decisions negatively towards these communities.

The ongoing disinformation campaigns not only threaten the safety and dignity of individuals but also complicate efforts for transitional justice in Syria by distorting historical narratives and undermining the experiences of victims. The manipulation of public discourse serves to entrench divisions within society, making it increasingly challenging for Syrians to reclaim their narrative amidst a backdrop of hostility and misinformation.

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